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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HO\'T ARD F. SEYBOLD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
7641

l~NION

PACIFIC RAILROAD COi\lp ANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
(All figures in parentheses are the page number of
the record. The parties will be referred to as they
appeared in the lower court.)
This is an appeal by plaintiff (210) from a judgment
and decree (208) entered by the court after granting
defendant's motion to set aside verdict and judgment
entered thereon and to enter judgment for the defendant
notwithstanding said verdict (207).
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This was an action to recover damages for personal
injuries suffered by the plaintiff in a railr<?ad crossing
accident occurring at Roberts, Idaho, November 14, 1949.
The case was tried before a jury and a verdict rendered
in plaintiff's favor in the sum of $1,500.00 (10).
During the trial of the case the defendant made a
motion for a directed verdict and the court in denying
said motion state·d that he believed the case resolved
itself into a jury question ( 150). After the jury returned
the foregoing verdict the defendant filed a motion for a
new trial (205) and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ( 207) . The trial court by its judgment
and decree kept under advisement the motion for a new
trial but granted the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury and entered judgment
in favor of defendant (208).
STATEMENT OF FACTS·
This is a usual crossing case in the sense that the
testimony of plaintiff and the railroad is in direct conflict.

Plaintiff testified that it was not very easy to see

and that it was quite dark (22) at the time of the collision and that the caboose came onto the crossing without
lights and without warning or signals of any kind. The
railroad introduced evidence that the crossing was light,
that bells and gongs were ringing. and lights were on
the caboose and men were standing on the caboose and
in the crossing signaling with lights and voice to plain-
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tiff to stop. Since the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted the evidence must be viewed
in its light most favorable to plaintiff. We, therefore,
in making this statement, will follow this well-established
rule and state the evidence as presented by plaintiff.
The accident occurred at the Rigby Crossing at
Roberts, Idaho, at approximately 7:00 o'clock P.M. on
the 14th day of November, 1949 (17). The plaintiff was
driving a truck from Leadore, Idaho, to the auction
yards- at Idaho Falls. The truck was loaded with eighteen head of beef cattle. It was a 1¥2-ton heavy-use truck
with a 26-foot semi-trailer. The trailer was attached to
the cab of the truck (16). The tracks of the defendant
railroad company run in a north-south direction and
the highway crosses these tracks at right angles and
runs east and west. The plaintiff, at the time of the
collision, was driving in an easterly direction and the
caboose of the defendant was proceeding south over the
crossing and was on the so-called passing track. A detailed description of the crossing should here be given.
THE CROSSING
In the file is found a pencil diagram, not drawn to
scale, of the crossing and its immediate surroundings.
While this was not introduced as an exhibit, it is an
accurate portrayal of the diagram which was placed on
the blackboard and referred to by the witnesses during
the course of the trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There are three tracks on this crossing, each of
which runs north and south. The tracks are parallel with
Highway No. 91. Between 150 and 175 feet south (59)
of the depot Highway No. 48, running in an east and west
direction, crosses the three tracks and connects with
Highway No. 91. Plaintiff was proceeding south on
Highway 91 and turned east onto Highway No. 48 and
across the tracks. The three tracks, starting from the
west, are known as the Team Track, the Passing Track
and the Main Line Track. The distance from the middle
of Highway No. 91 to the middle of the Team Track is
79 feet, from the Team Track to the Passing Track 43
feet, and from the Passing Track to the Main Line Track
17 feet. There are red flasher signal lights on each side
of the. crossing. These signals are 15 feet west of the
Team Track and 15 feet east of the Main Line Track.
The depot building itself is north of the crossing and
east of the tracks. The surroundings are portrayed by
pictures introduced in evidence as Defendant's Exhibits
"1" to "6" inclusive. At the time of the collision the
crossing was shrouded in darkness (22, 38).
This crossing was e~tensively used. It appeared that
trucks had been using it all day long on the day of the
accident ( 136, 139).

THE AC.CIDENT
Plaintiff was driving his truck in a southerly direction on Highway No. 91. He made a left hand turn from
this highway onto Highway No. 48. He slowed at the
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intersection, 1nade the turn and stopped at the flasher
light, 'vhich was in operation (18). He described the
turn as a ~~rather hard one to make" and estimated his
speed at about five or six miles per hour and stated that
the cattle being as top heavy as they "\vere he could not
negotiate that turn going more than seven or eight miles
on hour at the most (18). He caused his truck to come
to a complete stop at this flasher and noted that the
locomotive was standing on the main line track (18, 38)
between the depot and the crossing (19). It was headed
south. He saw the big headlight of the engine shining
across the crossing in a southerly direction. He estimated
that the engine "\Vas about 75 feet from the crossing.
It was not in motion. He knew that the engine on the
main line track activated the flasher signal at the crossing. Believing that the standing engine was activating
the flasher he shifted into first gear and started across
the crossing (19). Because of his knowledge that the
engine was making the flasher work he considered that
it was safe to go across the crossing. As he proceeded
to traverse the crossing, he kept his eyes on the engine
and the road (20). He did not see anything until the
light of the engine seemed to black out and then he looked
up and noticed the caboose. At the time the caboose was
just a few feet from plaintiff's truck and was· on the
passing track. He merely got a fleeting glimpse of the
caboose-not more than a second. He did not notice any
lights on the caboose and saw no people there. No one
was on the road as he attempted to trave·rse the crossing (21).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff detailed the observations he made as he
proceeded over the crossing on cross-examination as
follows (39, 40) :

"Q. Did you look along the passing track to
your left~
"A. It was quite dark there, and that locomotive headlight was flashing across the crossing. I
looked, I couldn't see anything at that time.
"Q.

Did you look up this track to your leftf

"A.

Yes, I did.

"Q. You said you didn't see

anything~

"A. That is right.
"Q. After you proceeded across, you said you
saw the caboose just before the collision~
"A.

Yes, I did.
it~

"Q. How far away was

"A. Oh, it was six or seven feet.
*

*

*

*

*

"Q. Did you see the man at the end of the
caboose, on the platform~

"A.

I didn't see a man on the caboose.

"Q.

Did you look at the

platform~

"A.
close.

You don't have much time to look that

"Q.

Did you look to see if a man was on there f

"A.
there.

Not to look to see if there was a man on
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"Q. You would say there was no Inan
" . .£\...
.

there~

I would say there was no man there.

"Q. You would testify there was not a man
there"?
''A.

Yes.

"Q. Did you see the
'~A.

lights~

No, sir.

"Q. You had to look awfully
"A.

fast~

Yes.

"Q. You would testify there were no lights~
"A.

Yes, there were no lights.

"Q. You would say there were no lights on
the

caboose~

"A. I would say there were no lights on the
caboose.

"Q.

There were no lights inside the

"A.

No lights.

"Q.

No lights at

"A.

That is right.

all~

"Q. It was completely
"A.

caboose~

dark~

That is right."

Plaintiff testified that there were no lights at this
crossing and a person cannot see anything; that by the
time he had gotten as far as he had the arc lights were
behind him and also the street lights of Roberts and
there were no bright lights he could see (21).
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Plaintiff was dazed for a period of time after which
he made observations as to the relative positions of the
truck and caboose ( 22). The impact occurred just at the
rear of the door of the cab on the truck. The caboose,
after it hit the truck, glanced off and ran up on the
cattle rack and was hooked there. The rack and cab of
the truck had turned partly over on its side and the
caboose was keeping the cab of the truck from going on
over (22).
In the collision plaintiff received gashes on his head
and his left knee and the cartilage of his knee was
torn (24, 26).
We will not go into the details of the damages resulting to plaintiff from the injuries sustained because the
only matter of interest on this appeal is whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of
liability against the defendant company.
The defendant introduced in this case what may be
termed the usual railroad evidence. If the plaintiff
crossed the crossing unde·r the conditions described by
defendant's testimony, the only conclusion that reasonable persons could reach is that plaintiff was attempting
to commit suicide.
The conductor of the crew that had charge of this
caboose testified he was standing in the middle of the
crossing between the main line and the passing tracks;
that he was yelling and waiving his electric lamp to
attract the attention of the plaintiff ( 61, 63). He testi-
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fied that the engine was halfway between the north switch
and the depot, which would mean that the engine was
some 400 feet from the crossing at the time the accident
occurred. Of course, this employee of defendant had to
ailluit that it was his duty to stand at the crossing to
conforn1 to the rules of the defendant company under
the conditions there existing and his failure to be there
\vould have been grounds for discipline (75). This would
be a good reason to discredit his testimony, because he
obviously had a n1otive for testifying as he did (75).
Howard Kunze, the rear brakeman, testified that he
was on the south end of the caboose· as it approached the
crossing (112). Before reaching the crossing he took
up the slack on the chain to the b~ake preparatory to
stopping on the other side of the crossing. When he was
105 feet from the crossing he noticed plaintiff's truck
(113). The truck at ~that time was going south on Highway No. 91. After plaintiff made the turn onto Highway No. 48 he heard the engine of the truck accelerate
and it came over the crossing (114). He testified he was
in plain sight, hollering and waving the lantern at the
plaintiff and then the collision occurred (115).
There were other witnesses for defendant but the
above is the substance of defendant's case. The jury did
not believe this testimony but chose to accept the plaintiff's testimony and returned a verdict for him. The railroad testimony here was just a little too good to be believed unless it could be established that plaintiff was
bent on suicide.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
FOR DEFENDANT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.

POINT ll
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S
INJURIES.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO PROXIMATELY
CAUSE HIS OWN INJURIES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
FOR DEFENDANT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.

The only grounds upon which the trial court could
have entered judgment in favor of defendant notwithstanding the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff was either
(1) that as matter of law the evidence did not support
a finding of negligence on the part of defendant proximately causing plaintiff's injuries, or (2) that as matter
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of la"'" plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
ln order to justify this ruling of the trial court it is
necessary that reasonable minds could not differ upon
the propositions p·resented. We submit that the evidence
in this case presented jury questions on both of these

propositions and that the trial court erred in its ruling
granting defendant's motion and in entering judgment
1n favor of defendant.
We will discuss the evidence in detail under the
following points of the brief.

There is nothing in the

record indicating the ground upon which the. trial court
entered the judgment in favor of defendant.

It will,

therefore, be necessary to discuss each of the propositions mentioned.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S
INJURIES.

The trial court by its Instruction No. 3 ( 186, 187)
set forth the six grounds of negligence alleged in plaintiff's complaint. By its Instruction No. 8 (192) the court
instructed the jury that in order to find a verdict for
plaintiff the jury must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant was negligent in one or more of
the particulars set forth in Instruction No. 3.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We submit that the evidence in this case supported
a finding of negligence· upon the grounds mentioned in
said instructions. However, in order to support plaintiff's position that error was committed in ente~ing judgment for defendant it is only necessary that the court
conclude there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding that defendant was negligent in one of said
particulars and that such negligence proximately caused
injuries to plaintiff.
The situation which existed at the crossing at the
time plaintiff attempted to traverse it constituted a
hazardous condition. The crossing was dark. As plaintiff proceeded in an easterly direction, the arc lights
and the neon signs and lights in the stores west of the
highway were behind him. The engine formed a dark
background as it stood on the main line track. The
caboose as it approache·d the crossing was moving on the
westerly side of the engine. The engine would create a
condition making it extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to see the caboose. The headlight of the engine shone
south onto the crossing, adding further. to the difficulty
of seeing the caboose. The caboose was drifting along the
passing track and would make no noise as it approached
the crossing. This condition required that precautions
be taken by the defendant in affording a warning to
motorists traversing the crossing in an easte·rly direction.
It would be necessary for some type of signal to be given
other than merly the flasher signals on either side of the
tracks. A person approaching this crossing could well
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belio\ye that the signals "\Vere being activated by the
engine on the main line track. This being so, further
signals 'vere necessary. These signals should have been
in the form of lights on the caboose, thereby making its
Inoveinent and presence known to persons on the crossing
or by so1ne person standing on the crossing for the purpose of giving further signals to motorists. As shown
in the statement of facts, plaintiff testified that there
were no lights on the caboose (40) and there was no
person standing at or near the crossing giving signals
for the purpose of having him stop (21). The position of
the engine approximately 75 feet north of the· crossing
"\Vas in violation of the rule of the railroad which was
introduced in evidence as Exhibit "B."
We submit that this evidence establishes that the
defendant was guilty of negligence in the manner in
which it conducted these switching operations over and
across this crossing.

This negligence consisted of a

failure to give any warning whatsoever of the approach
of this caboose either by reasonably adequate signals
or warning at the crossing or by warning with adequate
lights or audible signal on the caboose itself. The railroad was also negligent in placing its engine, in violation
of its own safety rules, a scant 75 feet from the crossing,
thereby creating an obstruction to a view of the

caboo~e

as it approached the crossing.
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SIGNALS· AT THE CROSSING
We submit a jury could properly find that defendant company, to exercise reasonable care, should have
stationed a flagman on the crossing under the circumstances existing at the time plaintiff attempted to drive
across. A person could reasonably believe that the flasher
signal was being activated by the stationary engine on
the main line track and, hence, the jury could have
found that this signal was not adequate. The caboose
with no lights approached on the passing track against
the dark background of the engine. There was a conflict
in the evidence as to the presence of a flagman on the
crossing. Plaintiff testified that there was no flagman
there and no signal given. We submit that under the
authorities a jury question was thereby made out.
The conductor, Ray, admitted on the wittness stand
that the rules of the defendant company required that
under the circumstances existing at Roberts he, as conductor, should flag the crossing (75). In direct conflict
with the testimony of plaintiff this conductor testified
that he in fact flagged the crossing and was attempting
to stop plaintiff from traversing the crossing. From
these circumstances alone· the jury could infer that reasonable care required that the crossing be flagged under
the conditions then and there existing. The very purpose of this rule was to protect the· railroad company
not only so far as its own equipment was concerned .but
also to protect travelers on the highway who might come
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into collision 'vith the caboose as it silently drifted
soutlnvard hidden by the dark background of the engine
and the glare of the headlight.
The great weight of authority holds that safety rules
of a railroad company are admissible in evidence for the
consideration of the jury in determining whether or not
by violating such rules the railroad company was negligent. See Pollard v. Roberson, (Ga.) 6 S.E. 2d 203;
Callaway v. Pickard, (Ga.) 23 S.E. 2d 564; Southern
Pacific Co. v. Haight, 126 F. 2d 900; Peizer v. City of
Seattle, 24 P. 2d 444; Stevens v. Boston Elevated Ry.
Co., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338; Canham v. Rhode Island
Co., 35 Rhode Island 177, 85 Atl. 1050; Hurley v. Connecticut Co., 118 Conn. 276, 172 Atl. 86; Warner v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 168 U. S. 339, 18
S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 491; Deister v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 99 Kan. 525, 162 P. 282, L.R.A. 1917 C 784. See 2 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 282, at page 132.
Numerous cases have held that it is negligence unde.r
certain circumstances to fail to flag a crossing. We submit that under the authorities the case at bar presents
such a situation and plaintiff's testimony that no person
flagged the crossing presents an evidentiary basis for
a finding of negligence on the part of defendant. The
Tenth Circuit has had occasion to consider this matter
of flagging crossings. In Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v.

Golay, 155 F. 2d 842, 844, a collision occurred at a railroad crossing in Wyoming. At a crossing where there
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was an obstruction on the northwest corner, the tracks
running in an east-west direction and the road in a northsouth direction. The plaintiff's automobile was proceeding southerly and the train easterly. In speaking of the
relative duties of railroads and travelers on the highways
the court stated :

"* * * But the rights of the general public
and the rights of the railway company at street
crossings are mutual and reciprocal; and, although common convenience gives to trains precedence over automobiles in the use of crossings,
it is upon the condition that the company will give
due warning of the approach of its train in order
that those in automobiles may stop safely and
wait for the trains to pass. What constitutes
reasonable and timely warning depends upon the
circumstances and surroundings. For instance,
the vigilance and care must be greater at crossings in a populous city or town where the travel
is great than at ordinary crossings in the country.
And, as a general rule, whether reasonable care
and prudence require under all the circumstances
that special warning facilities be maintained at
a crossing in a city or town is a question of fact
for the jury."
In the case at bar there was testimony that considerable traffic had passed orver this crossing during
the day of the collision ( 136, 139).
The presence of an undue amount of traffic is not
essential in order to make a jury question of negligence·
in failing to have a flagman at a crossing. This is ex-
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emplified by another case of the Tenth Circuit: Interstate Motor Lines, Inc., v. Great Western Ry. Co., 161 F.
2d 968, 972, wherein the court stated:

"* * * But the

Inere

fact that a crossing is in
the country does not necessarily in all circumstances relieve the railway company of any duty
to maintain a special warning signal. If a crossing
in the country is peculiarly dangerous to travelers
on account of its location, or mode of construction, or because the track is curved, or the view is
obstructed, the railroad company is required in
the exercise of ordinary care to n1eet the peril
with a special warning signal such as a- bell, an
electric wigwag, a flash signal, or other like caution."
In speaking of the duty of a railroad to furnish a
flagman at a crossing the court in Green v. Southern
Pac. Co., 53 Cal. App. 194, 199 P. 1059, 1062, stated:

"* * * But the law does impose upon a railroad company the duty to use reasonable care,
corresponding to the circumstances constituting
the probable danger, to avoid injury to persons
lawfully traveling upon the public highway
crossed by the company's tracks and trains. It
then becomes a question for a jury to decide
whether or not it was negligence for the company
to run its cars across the highway without providing a flagman or some means of warning to
travelers at the place of crossing."
The court in Hinkle v. Southern Pac. Co., 12 Cal.
2d 691, 87 P. 2d 349, 354, pointed out that it was unnecessary that the traffic at a crossing be extraordinarily
heavy. In that case it stated:
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"* * * It is true the crossing is not in a popu..
lous city, but it is over a public highway where
there is much travel to and from a popular summer resort. Moreover, it is apparent from the
photographs introduced as exhibits that an unobstructed view of the tracks cannot be had until
one is almost upon them. The fact that a crossing
is frequently crossed over by travelers is not
an indispensable factor to a determination that
a crossing is a particularly dangerous one, but
the hazardous nature of the crossing may depend
upon the physical nature of the crossing itself."
Parenthetically the plaintiff particularly calls the
Court's attention to this Hinkle case in that the conflict
in that case was as great as the conflict presented in
the case at bar. The plaintiff in that case stated that
he was traversing the crossing when an unlighted backing train loomed out of the trees about 20 feet from his
automobile. He te!stified that he observed no lights and
nobody at the crossing. The railroad company introduced evidence that the backing engine was lighted; that
a member of the crew was on the crossing waving a
lantern and that plaintiff was drunk. The jury, which
was the trie.r of the fact, disbelieved this "pat" evidence
introduced by the railroad company just as the jury in
the case at bar disregarded the "pat" evidence of the
Union Pacific.
The court 1n St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v.
Prince, 145 Okla. 194, 291 P. 973, 977, held that the absence of a flagman presented a jury question of negligence even in the absence of statute. The court stated:
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''It is no"T well recognized that the duty may
exist outside of the statute to provide flagman,
gates, automatic bells, or other adequate warning
appliances, if the situation of the c.rossing reasonably requires it. And \vhether or not the situation
of any partjcular crossing requires such additional
warning, signs, appliances, etc., is a question for
a jury, where the evidence is such that reasonable men might reach different conclusions therefrom. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408,
12 S. Ct. 679, 684, 36 L. Ed. 485."
It will be noted that the court relied upon Gra.nd
Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. s. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 36
L. Ed. 485. This latter case is one of the leading cases
on signals at crossings and supports the original ruling
of the trial court herein that a jury question of negligence for lack of sufficient signal or warning was p-resented.
See also Engstrom v. Canadian N. R. Co., 153 Minn.
51, 190 N.W. 68, and Moody v. Canadian N. R. Co., 156
Minn. 211, 194 N.W. 639.
LIGHTS ON CABOOSE
Another method of warning travelers upon the highway that a caboose was in the process of being shunted
along the passing track would be· to place lights thereon
which would be visible to travelers on the highway. Another method would be to station a brakeman on the
front end of the caboose in order that he might give
signals both vocal and by light to such travelers. The
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plaintiff very definitely testified that there were no
lights and no man upon the caboose ( 40). The defendant
offered testimony that such lights and such crew member
were present but the jury could refuse to believe this
testimony and believe the testimony of plaintiff.
The failure to light the caboose would be a part of
the whole situation presented at the crossing. It may be
that if adequate lights had been on the caboose it would
not have been necessary to place a flagman on the crossing. However, as part of the negligence of the railroad
company plaintiff relies upon its failure to have the
caboose sufficiently lighted so that a traveler on the
highway would become aware of its presence. The headlight of the engine glaring upon the crossing in the eyes
of the traveler as he looked to the north would prevent
the traveler seeing a caboose shrouded in darkness drifting into the crossing.
The duty of the railroad in the case of shoving a car
over a crossing is stated in Colorado & 8. Ry. Co. v.
Chiles, 50 Colo. 191, 114 P. 661, 664, as follows:
"~ * * It is the duty of a railway company in
backing a train over such a crossing to employ
some reasonable me,ans to warn travelers that the
train is about to be backed over the crossing.
Some authorities say that it is the duty of the
company to have a brakeman on the rear end who
can signal the engineer as well as the endangered
traveler. Certain it is that some reasonable means
looking to the protection of the traveler should
be employed."
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We submit that cases where the shoving of a railroad car is involved are analogous to the situation in
the case at bar.
In speaking of a similar situation the court in Hines
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 105 Wash. 178, 177 P.
795, 797, stated:

"* *

Indeed, we see no room for any such
contention, (that defendant was not neglige:nt) in
view of the fact that the locomotive was running
backwards at such a rate of speed over this country crossing, with no headlight on the rear of the
tender, indicating that it was running in that direction, and no other lights upon it other than,
possibly, the red and white lanterns which were
on the rear of the tender, and which would not
suggest to an observer of reasonable caution, even
if he saw either of them, that the engine was
running in that direction at such a place as on a
main line track, out in the country, over a road
crossing."
*

See also Chung Sing v. Southern Pac. Co., 182 Cal.
609' 189 p. 281.

POSITION OF ENGINE
The evidence would support a finding that the
engine was standing on the main line track 75 feet from
the crossing at the time plaintiff stopped his truck preparatory to traversing the crossing. This was in violation of defendant's Rule 803(A) pleaded (4) and introduced in evidence as E~bit "B" (204).
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While this engine was not between plaintiff and
the caboose it was just as effective in obliterating an
adequate view of the caboose as if it were. Its position
together with its headlight created a condition which
prevented plaintiff from seeing the unlighted caboose
until it was too late. Its presence there tended to attract
plaintiff's attention to the engine. He would naturally
watch this engine as he slowly traversed the crossing.
Authorities ab.ove cited establish that this rule and
its violation could be considered in determining defendant's negligence. Other factors at the crossing here:tofore discussed under this point necessitate a conclusion
that the placing of the engine in this position under the
circumstances could support a finding of negligence in so
doing.
We submit that defendant's negligence was properly
left to the jury and error was later committed by entering judgment for defenda~t.

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED A JURY QUESTION OF
WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF
NEGLIGENCE WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO PROXIMATELY
CAUSE HIS OWN INJURIES.

The situation presented at this crossing as plaintiff
attempted to cross it constituted a trap with the engine
forming a dark background for the drifting caboose and
with its headlight glaring onto the crossing. Plaintiff
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was unable to adequately see the passing track or the
caboose. The fact that the flashing signals were being
activated would not necessarily require an ordinary
prudent person to wait lmtil they had stopped. As plaintiff approached the crossing from the east he stopped
and at that time observed the stationary engine on the
main line track, which he could reasonably conclude was
activating the signals. The placing of the engine in this
position with its headlight shining on the crossing and
the movement of the unlighted caboose in the southerly
direction without warning of its approach constituted
a chain of circumstances based upon defendant's negligence which prevented plaintiff from realizing the
dangerous condition which this crossing presented.
That the n~gligence of the defendant may be taken
into consideration in determining whether or not plaintiff
was contributorily negligent is well established by the
cases. An interesting discussion of this problem is contained in the case of Hines v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R·y.
Co., 105 Wash. 178, 177 P. 795, 797, wherein the court
stated:

"Counsel for respondent seek to have us shut
our eyes to the question of its negligence, and
proceed upon the theory that such negligence is
not a subject for proper inquiry at this time,
since they are relying upon the contributory negligence of appellant to defeat his recovery. This
view of the case we cannot assent to. This is one
of those cases where the- question of appellant's
contributory negligence is intimately related to
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the question of respondent's negligenc_e, since it
was the negligent acts of respondent which largely
induced appellant to act as he did. When respondent's servants failed to give such sign_als
by sound or lights as would attract the attention
of one about to pass over this country crossing,
indicating that the locomotive was running in that
direction, it clearly was guilty of negligence; and
such negligence becomes little short of a controlling factor in determining whether or not appellant was guilty of contributory negligence in acting as he did. As was well said by Judge Fullerton in Hull v. Seattle, Renton & Southern R. Co.,
60 Wash. 162, 167, 110 Pac. 804, 806 :
" 'A victim of an accident is entitled to have
his conduct judged by the circumstances surrounding him at the time of the accident-by the conditions as they appeared to one in his then situation-and if his conduct, when so judged, appears
to be that of a reasonably prudent person, he
cannot be said to be guilty of negligence.'
"This is not only the rule applicable generally
to contributory negligence, but it has peculiar
force and application to conditions which are the
creations of a defendant relying upon the contributory negligence of the injured person to escape
responsibility, when such conditions would naturally influence the action of the person charged
with contributory negligence. This is the principle
upon which our decision in Richmond v. Tacoma
R. & Power Co., 67 Wash. 444, 122 Pac. 351, was
largely rested; which dealt with a situation we
'
think, even less favorable to the injured person
than that 'vith which 've are here dealing.
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~,,,7 e

are also to re1nen1ber that this is not a
case 'vhere 've are asked to decide negatively that
there is not sufficient evidence of negligence on
the part of respondent to warrant recovery; but
"'"e are asked to decide affirmatively that it has
been conclusively proven that appellant was guilty
of contributory negligence-a question as to which
the burden of proof rested upon respondent. As
pointed out in the Richmond Case, greater caution is to be e-xercised in deciding as a matter of
law that a fact which the law requires to be affirmatively proven has been conclusively proiVen
than in merely deciding as a ·matter of law, negatively, that a fact has not been proven. It seems to
us that there is greater danger of invading the
province of the jury in the former than in the
latter case. That contributory negligence is an
affirmative defense, casting the burden of proof
upon the defendant to establish it, is the wellsettled law of this state. Benson v. English Lumber Co., 71 Wash. 616, 622, 129 Pac. 403."
That a dark background may eliminate contributory
negligence in failing to see an approaching train is declared in Green v. Southern Pac. Co., 53 Cal. App. 194,
199 P. 1059, 1061. In describing the situation existing
there the court stated:

"* * * It must be remembered, however, that
these incidents occurred in the dusk of evening,
when the clearness and certainty of daytime light
were absent; that the icehouse was in the background of the car as it approached; and therefore
that there is some room for doubt as to the degree
in which it 1nay be said that the view was clear
and unobstructed. This court cannot know to what
extent the daylight had faded."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
See also Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v. Lytle,
56 Nev. 192, 47 P. 2d 934, in which case the court held
the negligence of the driver of the automobile was for
the jury where the railroad left a black gondola coal car
on a dark crossing. Also Burroughs v. Southern Pacific
Co., 153 Or. 431, 56 P. 2d 1145.
The case at bar is more favorable to plaintiff than
Clark v. Union Pacific R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 47, 257 P. 1050.
In that case there was no evidence that plaintiff looked
or listened before he attempted to cross a crossing in
a heavy fog. The lack of signals of the approaching train
and the inability to see the train through the fog constituted a situation making the automobile driver's negligence a question of fact for the jury. A quotation in
that case from 2 Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence,
Section 1650, is particularly applicable here, to wit:
"But whether it is .negligent in him (the
travele,r) to fail to look and listen where, the view
is obstructed or where there are complicated circumstances calculated to deceive and throw him
off his guard, presents a question for the jury."

Evans v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 74 Utah 201,
206, 278 P. 809 also supports plaintiff's contention here.
In that case the train was backed over a crossing at night
without lights or warning. It was held that it could nort,
as a matter of law, be said that plaintiff saw the cars
standing or in motion prior to the collision. The question
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of pl~tiff's ~ontributory negligence 'vas there properly
left to the jury. In comparing that case with the Clark
case, supra, the court stated:
'"* * * The t\YO cases are alike, in that the
view of the driver of the approaching automobile
was obstructed, in one case by a fog, in the other
by darkness."

See also Pippy v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 79 Utah
439, 11 p. 2d 305.
In Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Golay, 155 F. 2d 842,
847, the defendant contended that the driver of the automobile involved in the crossing accident was guilty of
contributory negligence as matter of law. The appellate
court held that such was not the case and in discussing
the evidence stated as follows:

"* * * In a case of this kind, contributory
negligence seldom depends upon a single fact or
circumstance. Ordinarily, it depends upon many
relevant facts and surrounding circumstances,
and upon inferences fairly to be drawn from the
testimony produced. Viewed in that lig~t, we find
no warrant for holding that reasonable minded
persons would necessarily reach the conclusion
that plaintiffs were at fault in failing to see the
train in time for the automobile to be stopped
before reaching the crossing, that Fre.d Golay was
at fault in failing to stop the car, and that Ruth
Golay was likewise at fault in failing to warn her
husband of the approach of the train. In short,
we think the question of contributory negligence
was for the jury."
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Contention that contributory negligence was established as matter of law was made in Chung Sing v. Southern Pac. Co., 182 Cal. 609, 189 P. 281, 282. The court
held it was a jury question and stated :
"As to the second point, that of contributory
negligence, it appears that the accident occurred
on an evening in November when it was beginning
to get dusk. The train crew already had their
lanterns lit. The plaintiff was coming along Santa
Fe street, driving a two-horse wagon. The contention of the defendants is that the plaintiff
could and should have seen the car coming as he
approached the crossing in ample time to stop,
and that one of the switchmen was protecting the
crossing and signal4lg to traffic to stop. The
testimony of the plaintiff is, however, direct that
he approached the crossing slowly, and saw the
car standing still, at least as he supposed, and
then suddenly it came at him from across the
street. If this be true, and the jury was entitled
to believe it, there was no negligence on his part in
attempting to cross, unless he disregarded the
warning of the switchman. But as to such warning
there is a decided conflict, and the jury were entitled to find against the defendants on this point
as well. It follows that it cannot be said that the
verdict is not sustained by the evidence. Judgment affirmed."
Another case closely paralleling the case at bar on
the question of the contributory negligence is the case
of Moses v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 138 Kan. 347, 26 P.
2d 259, 261. The defendant in that case backed a string of
cars across a highway in the nighttime without light on
j
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the advancing cars and without sounding a warning of
any kind. The court in considering the evidence and
reaching its conclusion that a question of fact was presented stated:

* * The testimony of plaintiff was that
\vhen he approached the track he both looked and
listened for trains and cars and that he neither
saw nor heard any until he came within about ten
feet of the track. One taking these precautions
might reasonably assume that he could cross the
track without danger. He had no right to anticipate that a train would be pushed or pulled over
the crossing in the nighttime without lights or
warning of some kind. If the brakeman had been
posted on the end of the advancing string of cars
with a swinging lantern, it would have constituted some warning to the plaintiff, and if such
a precaution had been taken, probably the casualty would have been averted. It is urged that
plaintiff might have stopped his automobile after
discovering the approaching cars when he was
within ten or twelve feet of the track. According
to the testimony he attempted to do so and
whether his failure to do so on that limited space
and time was contributory negligence was a fair
question for the determination of the jury. This
court is not warranted in declaring as a matter of
law that his failure to do so in the brief time and
space available constituted contributory negligence."
~~*

The fact that flasher signals were in operation does
not require a finding that plaintiff failed to exercise
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plained, the plaintiff thought, and could in the exercise
of reasonable care think, that the flasher was being activated by the stationary engine standing upon the main
line track 75 feet to the north of the crossing. In fact
the e·ngine was causing the flasher light to operate (19).
Plaintiff then proceeded to cross and was hit by a caboose
which came out from the darkness created by the engine
and the headlight. In point on this question is the case
of Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Shell, (Ark.) 185 S.W. 2d
81, wherein an automobile with four occupants was involved in a crossing accident with a passenger train.
All four occupants of the automobile were killed. As the
automobile approached the crossing it could be observed
that there were locomortives standing on each side of the
highway and the blinker lights were in operation. Evidence established that the presence of at least one of
these locomotives was sufficient to cause these lights to
flash.

The headlights of both engines were burning.

The court held that the driver of the automobile and the
passengers were not guilty of contributory negligence
as matter of law. In reaching this conclusion the court
stated:
"Numerous cases in which it was held that
one injured in a collision at a railroad crossing
was precluded from recovering are cited by appellants, bu~ no~e of ithem presents exactly the
same fact situation as the case at bar. 'No inflexible rule can be laid down as to when or under
what .circ~stances a traveler at a public railroad
crossrng will be free from contributory negligence
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in going over the crossing; but each case must
neeessarily depend upon its own particular facts.'
Smith v. ~fissouri Pacific Railroad Con1pany, 138
Ark. 589, 211 S.,,r. 657, 658.
"Under the testimony presented in this case
the question of contributory negligence on the part
of the occupants of the auton1obile was one for
the jury to decide. * * *
~',Vhile

the warning lights were flashing when
these men drove on the crossing, it appears that
there were two locomotives, one standing on each
side of the crossing and facing the crossing, and
there was testimony that one of these would have
set the 'blinker' signal to operating. The jury
might have concluded that this led the occupants
of the auton1obile to assrune that the signal was
being operated as a result, of the proximity of
one of the locomotives standing near the crossing
and that, for that reason, failure to heed this
warning was not necessarily negligent.
"It is, of course, the duty of anyone driving
a vehicle, in approaching a railroad crossing, to
look and listen for an approaching train before
crossing the track, and to stop the vehicle, if it
becomes necessary to do so, in order to look and
listen. It is undisputed that Shell, in approaching
the crossing, was driving very slowly, but there
was no testimony as to whether or not he or any
of the other occupants of the automobile looked
or listened for a train. The switch engine was
standing on a spur track, near the main line, about
400 feet down the track in the direction of the
approaching passenger. Several witnesses-one
introduced by appellants-testified that the headlight of this standing switch engine was burning.
The jury may have considered that the presence
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of the two locomotives, which were standing still,
coupled with the failure of the ?·pera~ors of the
passenger train to give the require~ signal~, created a situation which did nOit establish negligence
on the part of the driver of the automobile in
proceeding to cross the track slowly."
In Hough v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 133 Kan.
757, 3 P. 2d 499, 501, a judgment for plaintiff in a crossing case was affirmed. At the time the plaintiff's automobile attempted to traverse the crossing a wigwag appliance was in operation. A train was in the vicinity of
the crossing which could have activated the signal. Another train came along and collided with the plaintiff's
automobile. In holding that the question of plaintiff's
contributory negligence was one for the jury the court
stated:
"The principal question presented by the defendant is t.hat the injury and loss sustained by
plaintiff was due to his own negligence. The
negligence attributed to plaintiff is based mainly
on the fact that the wigwag was in operation and
the gong thereon ringing when plaintiff undertook
to drive across the tracks laid over the street. It
is argued that the wigwag and gong in operation
was a notice to plaintiff that there 'was a train
in the vicinity, and that he should have waited
until the bell stopped ringing. The wigwag with
a bell ringing is not always a certain signal that
a train is approaching a crossing or that there
is a_ present danger in passing the crossing. A
moVIng or standing train in any part of the block
would start the operation of the bell and continue
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tachn1ents "rere such that a train standing or nloving in the zone as much as 1,200 feet away from
the crossing would cause the ringing of the bell,
and the appliance 1night be jn operation a considerable time without a train approaching the
crossing or even an intention to propel it ove,r the
crossing. The ringing of that bell was of course
notice to the traveler that a train was moving or
standing somewhere within the block, and warned
him to look out for trains approaching the crossing, but did not require him to wait there indefinitely while the bell was ringing."
The court quoted fron1 Frank v. Reading Company,
297 Pa. 233, 146 A. 598, 599, as follows:

"* * * Evidence as to ringing of crossing bells
may be shown as proof of contributory negligence,
but is ordinarily for the jury. Such evidence cannot be accepted as showing that defendant has
discharged its duty, nor is it conclusive that a
pedestrian or a driver must know a train is coming
and should be governed accordingly. Here there
is no evidence to show the ringing of this particular bell came from the approach of the train that
caused the accide·nt."
To the same effect on principle see Newton v.
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 P. 567, and
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Deneen, 167 F. 2d 799.
In the case at bar the flasher signals were not being
activated by the caboose which hit plaintiff's truck (74).
The uncontradicted evidence is that the standing engine
on the main line track activated them (19, 74).
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True it is that plaintiff did not wait a half hour
but how was he to know that a car was moving on the
passing track~ Would he be required to wait when from
all appearances the standing engine, which did not hit
him, was activating the signals~
The language of this Court in Newton v. Oregon

Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219, 226 134 P. 567, is applicable here:
"Where, therefore, the circumstances are such
that it may reasonably he said that different
minds, in viewing and considering the evidence,
might arrive at different conclusions with respect
to whether or not the injured person exercised
ordinary care, the question of negligence must of
necessity be determined as one of fact and not of
law. While the substance of the foregoing statement is often found in the books and may be said
to be a correct statement of the doctrine, yet such
statements often leave the reader in doubt whether
a given case falls within or without the doctrine.
But, notwithstanding this, it is impossible to formulate a rule by which all cases can be determined.
"All that can be said is that, unless the question of negligence is free from doubt, the court
cannot pass upon it as a question of law; that is,
if after considering all the evidence and the inferences that rnay be deduced therefrom the court
is in doubt whether reasonable men in viewing
a~d considering all the evidence, mi~ht arrive at
different conclusions, then this very doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the jury
and not one of law for the court. The court can
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pass upon the question of negligence only in clear
cases. Alt others should be submitted to the jury.
The reason of this is apparent from the fact that
in this state all questions of fact are for the jury;
and therefore, unless it is clear that in viewing
and considering the evidence reasonable minds
might not arrive at different conclusions, the case
should go to the jury."
To the same effect see Malizia v. Oregon Short Line

R. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756; Steed v. Rio Grande
Western Ry. Co., 29 Utah 448, 82 P. 476.
We submit that the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was one for the jury to determine and
under the circumstances it in fact found that plaintiff
was not guilty of contributory negligence.
CONCLUSION
The trial court by entering its judgment for defendant contrary to the jury's verdict denied to plaintiff his
right of trial by jury. Its ruling is, jn effect, a directed
verdict for defendant. Only if reasonable minds cannot
differ upon the two propositions of defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence. can this ruling be correct. That eight jurors reached a result contrary to the trial court is certainly some evidence that
reasonable minds can differ upon these propositions.
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It is a serious undertaking to set aside a jury verdict on
the basis that all reasonable minds must conclude that
the eight jurors were~ entirely wrong.
We submit that the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, W ALLAC·E, BLACK,
ROBERTS & BLACK
DWIGHT L. KING
Counsel for Plaintiff and
Appellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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